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Abstract Recently, many cities have launched new rail transit lines. Once these
new rail transit lines start commercial operation, they will play important roles as
competitors to conventional bus services. In this paper, the effects of nationalization
on equilibria have been studied in a mixed duopoly public transport market, in
which one publicly-owned rail transit operator competes with one private bus
operator. Two numerical case studies show the nationalization of a rail transit
company is always socially desirable both in Bertrand pricing game in the short run
and in Nash non-cooperative game in the long run.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1990s, in parallel with the trend towards deregulation and privatization,
the organizations of public transport in many cities have been undergoing a radical
transformation. As for the bus market, it exhibits a transition from a state-owned
monopolistic form to a private competition regime in some developing regions and
transition countries, such as China. Under franchise agreements, private bus
companies can freely provide local services to residents. However, due to the huge
capital requirement and substantial economies of scale, most rail transit systems
around the world are typically operated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Since
the 2000s, in order to transform SOEs from cost centers to economic entities
responsible for certain profit targets, transit authorities have begun to restructure
these SOEs into limited liability companies or joint stock companies, which can be
termed as ‘‘corporatization’’ or ‘‘partial privatization’’. Consequently, the prevailing
organization in urban public transport market presents such a structure that one
(semi-) public rail transit operator competes with one or several private bus
companies, which suggests the presence of a mixed oligopoly.1 As an example,
Shanghai-one of the largest cities in China, has more than 1000 bus lines, served by
more than 10 private bus companies. However, all rail transit lines are only operated
by one company—Shengtong Metro Company, which was originally a complete
public entity. In 2000, it was reformed as a semi-public cooperation with 63.65 % of
its share holding by Shanghai municipality. Mixed oligopolies are also common in
some developing countries’ cities (such as Santiago in Chile, Kuala Lumpur in
Malaysia), in which multiple operators with different ownership are vying for
passengers. Even in the developed countries, such as Norway, Sweden, the public
governments also hold some degree of ownership in transport firms serving local
markets (Jørgensen and Santos 2014).
While the coexistence of public and private operators become prevailing in the
local transport sector, overall it is still a new competition form. In such a mixed
oligopoly, public and private operators have a different management goal, which
raises important issues on pricing and service level decisions. On the service level
aspect, private operators aim to maximize its profit, so both private monopoly and
oligopoly competition intend to provide much less service frequency than the
socially desired level. In some Chinese cities, it is frequently reported public
transport passengers often suffer from long waiting times due to inadequate service
levels afforded by private operators. On the price aspect, private operators may
charge high fare which eventually hurts the whole welfare. Inefficient service
supplies of private monopoly and oligopoly may overshadow the possible benefits
of private ownership, motivating the entry of welfare-maximizing public operators
to compete against the profit-maximizing private firms. However, there is still a
debate as to whether the mixed oligopoly competition can contribute to adjusting
the market failures arising from private oligopoly. Being aware of these issues, the
1 In the field of industrial economics, mixed oligopoly refers to the competition between public firms,
which are instructed to maximize their contributions to welfare, and profit-maximization private
companies.
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objective of this paper is to investigate the market outcomes and welfare effects of
the mixed oligopoly competition in an urban transport market, which is necessary
and timely given that the mixed oligopoly is present in a broad range of countries.
More specifically, we consider the strategic interactions between one public rail
transit company and one private bus company and attempt to answer the following
questions: if one rail transit operator chooses to partially maximize consumer
surplus rather than to solely maximize its own profit, how will this affect equilibria
and, most importantly, could it really contribute to increasing social welfare as its
organizational objective concerns?
The deregulation and privatization in the urban transport market have led to
extensive research on the strategic behaviors of oligopolistic competition during
recent decades, using either Cournot (e.g., Viton 1981; Oldfield and Emmerson
1986; Williams and Abdulaal 1993) or Bertrand (e.g., Braid 1986; De Palma and
Leruth 1989; Wang and Yang 2005; Wichiensin et al. 2007) games. These studies
provide considerable insights into private oligopolistic competitions. Moreover,
mixed competition between public and private firms is also prevalent in a diverse
range of industries, leading to extensive research on the mixed oligopoly (MO) in
economic theory (See, De Fraja and Delbono 1990; Cremer et al. 1991; Anderson
et al. 1997; Matsumura 1998; Fujiwara 2007). While there is a huge literature on
mixed oligopoly in some industrial sectors, such as telecommunications and
banking sectors, only a little attention has been paid to modelling mixed
oligopolistic competitions in the transport market. For the seaport industry, Czerny
et al. (2014) explored the effect of privatization a port for a local market.
Matsushima and Takauchi (2014) investigated how port privatization affects port
charges, profits and welfare elements from an international perspective. In the
aviation sector, Matsumura and Matsushima (2012) and Mantin (2012) investigated
behavioural patterns of airports for international air transport markets, where one
domestic publicly-owned airport competes against one private airport in another
country. In addition to these intra-mode competition models, Yang and Zhang
(2012) investigated the effect of inter-modal competition between air transport and
high speed rail (HSR) in a mixed duopoly framework. Very recently, D’Alfonso
et al. (2014) analyzed the impacts of competition between one private airline and
one public HSR on the environment and social welfare. In the urban transport
market, Cantos-Sa´nchez and Moner-Colonques (2006) explored frequency and
pricing competition between one private bus and one public rail transit using a
quadratic address model. Employing a quadratic utility function, Clark et al. (2009)
compared equilibrium results that arise from collusion, applying Cournot and
Bertrand competitions for a mixed duopoly bus market.
The review of the above-mentioned papers reveals three common features. First,
the above studies only focus on full nationalization. In reality, however, the
transport market is likely to have partially nationalized transport operators,
especially in the urban transport market. For example, in China, Hangzhou
government holds 51 % of the share in Hangzhou Metro Company; the Norwegian
Transit Authority holds the majority of shares in 36 bus companies. Despite these
prevailing real world cases, the implications of partial privatization for frequency
and pricing choices have not been investigated in the transport sector. Our research
The welfare effects of nationalization in a mixed duopoly…
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intends to fill in this gap. Second, all these papers adopt linear demand functions,
which can easily obtain analytical solutions. But, when exploring competitions
among firms, an attraction model with nonlinear form is superior to linear one since
it can not only represent reality more closely but also can reflect the nonlinear
effects arising in competitive phenomena (Huang et al. 2013). To this end, we adopt
a non-linear demand function (that is, a Logit model) in this paper to obtain more
general and practical conclusions. Finally, some studies assumed the aggregate
demand for the whole market is inelastic with respect to fare or full cost. Actually,
this is a very strict assumption. In this paper, a more realistic case will be developed
in which total local transport demand is elastic with respect to the combination of
fare and frequency.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: (1) given the
growing importance of partial nationalization in the transport sector, this paper fills
the research gap by analyzing the effects of partially nationalizing a rail transit
company that competes with a private bus service. (2) in contrast to most mixed
oligopoly studies with linear demand function, we employed an attraction demand
function with non-linear form to provide more practical and general insights; (3)
Using a Chinese case study, two time horizons are analyzed for this vertically and
horizontally differentiated mixed duopoly competition: a short time horizon in
which operators compete only in fares, and a long time horizon in which they
compete in frequency along with the price.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a model using a
Nash non-cooperative game in a mixed duopoly public transport market. In Sect. 3,
to evaluate the effects of nationalization on equilibrium results, two numerical cases
for short-run and long-run competitions are conducted by using Suzhou traffic data.
Additionally, sensitivity analysis has been carried out to generalize the results. Main
findings and recommendations for further research are reported in Sect. 4.
2 Modeling framework
2.1 Basic setting of Nash non-cooperative game
This study focuses on a mixed duopoly public transport market, in which one semi-
public rail transit operator,which is fully or partially concerned with users’ benefits,
competes with a private bus company, which only considers its own profits. Since
each player is trying to ‘‘optimize its objective function without prior knowledge of
other players’ functions’’ (Evans 1992), these two players make their decisions
simultaneously without any collusion and receive payoffs depending on the service
levels they offer. In this setting, the Nash non-cooperative Game in the context of
mixed duopoly has the following features:
Players Nowadays, although multiple private bus companies prevail in some
cities, few overlapping operating situations lead us to view them as one virtual
operator. Thus, we theoretically assume only one bus operator competes with one
(semi-) public rail transit operator on an isolated route during a given period.
F. Qin et al.
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Strategies In the field of transport modelling, the strategic interaction occurs either
in the price dimension (Bertrand) or in the quantity dimension (Cournot). What type
of competition is appropriate not only depends on the strategic variables employed
but also largely depends on the production technology and the time horizon (Kreps
and Scheinkman 1983). Cournot competition may be applicable when the capacity
is difficult to adjust (e.g., rail, airport) and productions are perceived as perfect
substitutes. But, when capacities are flexible (e.g., bus) and products are more
differentiated, a Bertrand competition would be more appropriate (Quinet and
Vickerman 2004). In the case of a competition between bus and rail transit, it is not
evident which type of competition is more proper based on the ease or difficulty of
capacity adjustment. Bus and rail services are not only horizontally differentiated in
terms of their distinct mode features but also vertically differentiated in terms of
different service qualities. This implies that the substitution between these two
modes is imperfect and the products are differentiated. As a result, we believe a
differentiated Bertrand competition may be reasonable for the short run competi-
tion.
Besides price and quantity, frequency is another important strategic device. In the
short run, since the increasing number of departures could require additional fleets,
frequency is difficult to change. Thus, operators only compete over price, assuming
frequency is exogenously given. But, in the long run, operators may compete over
frequency along with fare since operators can relocate stops and buying more fleet.
Payoff In the field of mixed oligopoly, the conventional objective function of one
public company is to maximize social welfare, which is the sum of consumer
surplus, its own profit and the profits of private companies. However, in the context
of competition, it is somewhat unreasonable to assume the rail transit company
competing against one bus company also needs to consider its rival’s profit.
Therefore, we assume, in addition to the rail company’s profit, the rail company
takes consumers’ interests into account when it decides fare and frequency. The
profit of the bus company is out of its consideration. This kind of treatment is
adopted by much recent literature (Clark et al. 2009; Jørgensen and Santos 2014). It
is reasonable to assume one private bus company is only concerned with
maximizing its profit.
2.2 Demand functions and operating cost
In view of the mixed duopoly competition between one public rail transit operator
and one private bus operator, this sub-section begins by constructing a demand
function for operator i (Hereafter, the subscript r will be used to denote rail transit
and the subscript b for bus), which conventionally takes the following form:
Qi ¼ Q n; ccf gMi i ¼ b; r ð1Þ
where, Qi is the number of passengers selecting public transport service i. Q*{n, cc}
represents total traffic demand of public transport sector, which is the function of
composite costs (cc) and one positive parameter n (n[ 0). Mi denotes the market
share of public transport service afforded by operator i.
The welfare effects of nationalization in a mixed duopoly…
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The total demand for local public transport is assumed to be an exponential
function of composite costs (cc)2:
Q ¼ Q exp nðcc ccÞ½  ð2Þ
The composite cost (cc) represents the expected disutility of using public
transport modes. A bar over a variable denotes its value in a reference case before
competition takes place. Thus, Q is the initial total public transport demand in a
benchmark situation and cc means the composite cost of a reference case. Total
demand for local public transport is elastic, because any changes in composite cost
will shift the travelling demand between public transport modes and private
transport modes (such as private cars, motorbikes, etc.).
To reflect the elasticity of total demand change with respect to travellers’
composite costs, we further specify the formulation of composite costs as:
cc ¼  1
h
ln
X
expðhCiÞ ð3Þ
Ci denotes the generalized cost of travelling by public transport mode i. h is a
positive dispersion parameter. In this paper, individual travellers’ mode choices are
assumed to be based on minimizing their generalized cost per trip (Ci), which equals
the sum of the monetary cost (fare) and the travel time weighted by value of time.
Ci ¼ Pi þ a1qTi þ a2qð1=2fiÞ ð4Þ
where Pi is the fare charged by public transport operator i. Ti is the average in-
vehicle travelling time using public transport service i, which can be computed
based on travelling distance and speed. Normally, during rush hour, the public
transport services are much more frequent. Thus, the average waiting time can be
roughly estimated from one-half the inverse of frequency (fi). q is the value of time
(VOT). a1 and a2 are parameters that measure different weights that passengers put
on in-vehicle travelling time and waiting time. To focus on the principal aspects,
this paper confines itself to the case of one homogeneous passenger group, which
indicates all passengers are identical in regard to the value of time. Furthermore, for
both bus and rail transit services, since the station location and number of stops have
been decided in the planning stage, accessing time costs have not been included in
the generalized cost function.
Turning to the specifications of travelling mode choices, the market share of
operator i is given by the Binary Logit form:
Mi ¼ expðhCiÞP
i expðhCiÞ
ð5Þ
Inserting Eqs. (5), (2) and (3) into Eq. (1), after some manipulation, the number
of passengers that choose public transport service i is:
2 With this exponential function, the elasticity of total public transport demand will be proportional to
composite cost ecc ¼ oQ=occð Þðcc=QÞ ¼ ðnÞccð Þ. This is a property of public transport demand which
has been found in many studies (see Johansen et al. 2001; Fearnley et al. 2004).
F. Qin et al.
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Qi ¼ Q
X
i
exp h Cið Þ
" #nh
exp hCið Þ
X
i
exp hCið Þ
" #n
h1
ð6Þ
where Ci denotes the generalized cost of mode i in reference case. To show the
impact of price and frequency on travel demand, we evaluate partial derivatives of
Eq. (6) after substituting into (4) from (4) and (5):
oQi
oPi
¼ Qi nMi þ hMj
 
\0 i; j 2 b; rf g i 6¼ j ð7Þ
oQi
oPj
¼ ðh nÞQiMj[ 0 i 6¼ j ð8Þ
oQi
ofi
¼ a2q
2f 2i
QiðnMi þ hMjÞ[ 0 ð9Þ
oQi
ofj
¼ ðn hÞ a2q
2f 2j
QiMj\0 ð10Þ
Various studies have shown that (h–n)[ 0 in the urban public transport market
(Williams and Abdulaal 1993). From the above equations, it is clear that a high fare
of one public transport service will reduce its own demand and increase the demand
of its competitor. An increase of frequency will boost its own demand rate and
simultaneously reduce the demand of its competitor.
The variable operating costs of public transport service i (OCi) is the sum of
marginal passenger cost (ci0) plus the variable cost (ci1) associated with service
frequencies:
OCi ¼ ci0Qi þ ci1fi ð11Þ
2.3 Price competition in the short run
In a mixed oligopoly market, the bus operator is viewed as a pure commercially
oriented company, which is only concerned with maximizing its profit. The profit of
private bus company (pb) is defined as the fare-box revenue minus the costs
associated with bus operation (OCb):
OFb ¼ pb ¼ PbQb  OCb ð12Þ
As mentioned earlier, the public rail transit operator maximizes a weighted
combination of its profit and consumer surplus of the whole public transport market.
Given the proposed exponential demand function, the explicit form of consumer
surplus can be simply expressed as:
CS ¼ Q=n ð13Þ
The welfare effects of nationalization in a mixed duopoly…
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This simple expression for consumer surplus was derived by Evans (1992), and
has since been used extensively by many studies (Williams and Abdulaal 1993;
Wichiensin et al. 2007). The parameter n can be interpreted from two perspectives.
Firstly, n quantifies the sensitivity of the total local transport demand with respect to
composite costs. The second interpretation is that the inverse of n is the average
perceived benefit experienced by one representative traveler. Accordingly, the rail
operator’s objective function can be specified as:
OFr ¼ rCSþ pr ¼ rðQ=nÞ þ ðPrQr  OCrÞ ð14Þ
The continuous parameter r, which ranges from 0 to 1, can be referred as the
‘‘weight’’ attached to consumer surplus. It gives a measurement of nationalization
degree. r = 0 signifies the rail company is solely concerned with its profits. As r
rises, the weight on consumer surplus becomes heavier in rail transit firm’s
objective function. When r = 1, the rail transit operator is fully nationalized and
aims to maximize the sum of consumer surplus and its own profit.
In this mixed duopoly market, each operator attempt to maximize its distinct
objective function with respect to strategic valuables, subject to a capacity
constraint.
Max
Pi;fi
OFi
s:t: QiKifi
ð15Þ
Ki is the designed vehicle capacity of public transport services i.
In the short run, since the expansion of rolling stocks is strongly limited, the
service frequency is assumed to be exogenously given. To this end, competition
between two public transport modes is in price only.
By setting the partial derivatives of payoff functions with respect to fare equal to
zero, and performing some manipulation, Nash equilibrium prices (Pi
NE; the
superscript NE denotes equilibrium) for operator i can be calculated. Details of the
derivation can be referred to ‘‘Appendix 1’’:
PNEi ¼
1 rð Þd
hMj þ nMi þ ci0 ð16Þ
The indicator variable d takes on the value of one for rail transit and 0 for bus.
Next, we further partially differentiate Eq. (16) with respect to its rival’s price
(Pj)
o2OFi
oPioPj
¼ oP
NE
i
oPj
¼ Mj 1Mj
 
h nð Þ ð17Þ
A closer look at the above mathematical expressions (16) for equilibrium fares
gives rise to some interesting insights. First, in the absence of capacity constraints,
the equilibrium price is equal to marginal passenger cost of public transport service
i (ci0) plus a mark-up, which relates to the market share of public transport services.
Second, when r ¼ 1 (that is, the public rail transit company considers whole
F. Qin et al.
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consumer surplus), the rail company consequently sets its fare equal to marginal
cost (ci0). Finally, since we have assumed that (h - n)[ 0 in urban public transport
market, we have o2OF

oPioPj[ 0, which implies one operator’s marginal profit
increases as its competitor’s fare increase. That is, the price set by the bus company
decrease (increase) in response to the price reduction (increase) of the rail transit
company oPNEi

oPj[ 0
 
. This property matches the well-known definition of the
strategic complement in oligopolies.
To test the effect of partial nationalization (r) on equilibrium fares, we invoke
the techniques of monotone comparative statics for the following analytical
derivations and obtain:
dPNEr ðrÞ
dr
¼  o
2OFr

oPror
o2OFr

oP2r
\0 ð18Þ
From Eq. (18), it is clear that with an increase of r, the equilibrium price falls for
rail transit. The explanation could be, an increase in r provides more incentives to
rail transit company to reduce its fare for improving consumer surplus. Furthermore,
since the equilibrium fares between bus and rail transit are strategic complements,
the bus fare correspondingly falls to compete for passengers. So we can conclude in
the mixed duopoly market, as the publicly-owned rail transit operator pays more
attention to consumer surplus relative to its own profit, equilibrium fares of bus and
rail transit both decreases.
2.4 Frequency-price competition in the long run
In the long run, since the frequency can be easily adjusted, it is reasonably assumed
that public transport operators compete in both price and frequency. To derive the
reaction functions for service frequency, a similar procedure is made by partially
differentiating the payoff function of operator i with respect to its frequency. After
some algebraic manipulation, the equilibrium service frequency is given as (Details
of the derivation can be referred to ‘‘Appendix 2’’):
f NEi ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
a2q
2ci1
Qi
r
ð19Þ
Obviously, the Nash Equilibrium frequency follows a ‘‘square root formula’’. By
analogy, the mathematical expression of equilibrium frequency can be further
differentiated with respect to the frequency of its competitor:
of NEi
ofj
¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
a2q
2ci1
r
1
2
Q
1
2
i
oQi
ofj
ð20Þ
From Eq. (10), we have oQi

ofj\0. Hence, the above equation takes a negative
sign, which indicates a marginal increase (decrease) in the frequency of rail transit
causes the bus operator to decrease (increase) its service frequency. This concept of
The welfare effects of nationalization in a mixed duopoly…
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strategic substitution clearly addresses the relationship of equilibrium frequencies
between bus and rail transit in this mixed oligopoly model.3
Summarizing the above analysis, we obtain Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 In the mixed duopoly market involving one private bus operator
and one public rail transit company, Nash Equilibrium fares are strategic
complements. Nash Equilibrium frequencies are strategic substitutes.
Proposition 1 offers an important extension, that is, the conventional concept of
strategic substitutes and complements in the private oligopoly can also appropriately
fit to the context of a mixed oligopoly model. It can contribute to explaining the
strategic behaviors (such as fare and frequency competitions) between the welfare-
maximizing public and profit-maximizing private operators.
Next, we investigate the impact of nationalization degree on equilibrium
frequency. Given the mathematical specification of equilibrium frequency for rail
transit in Eq. (20), we partially differentiate it with respect to r:
of NEr
or
¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
a2q
2ci1
r
1
2
QNEr
 1
2
oQNEr
oPNEr
oPNEr
or
ð21Þ
From Eqs. (7) and (21), we have oQNEr

oPNEr \0 and oP
NE
r

or\0, thus we can
confirm of NEr

or[ 0. This means the equilibrium frequency of rail transit increases
when rail operator places more weight on consumer surplus. Since the equilibrium
frequencies between bus and rail are strategic substitutes, an increase in r will
decrease the equilibrium frequency for bus ðf NEb Þ.
Proposition 2 summarizes the impact of nationalization degree (r) on equilibrium
fares and service frequencies.
Proposition 2 In line with the initial objective of increasing consumer surplus, a
lower degree of nationalization leads to (1) lower equilibrium fares for both rail
transit and bus; (2) higher equilibrium frequency for rail transit and lower
equilibrium frequency of bus.
As noted in Proposition 2, as the rail transit operator concerns consumer surplus
more, its fare decreases. Since prices are strategic complements, lower rail transit
fare will put downward pressure on bus fare. As a result, bus fare will, in
equilibrium, fall as well. On the other hand, the best respond functions of
frequencies are downward sloping, indicating frequencies are strategic substitutes.
More concerns about consumer surplus leads to an increase in rail transit’s
equilibrium frequency and this occurs at the expense of a reduction of bus
frequency.
3 As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the equilibrium result of Cournot competition is equivalent to
the outcome of a two-stage game, where there is a simultaneous capacity choice after which price
competition occurs (Kreps and Scheinkman 1983). In the mixed monopoly, this equivalence found by
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) is still valid, if assumptions of L-shaped marginal cost function and
efficient rationing rule hold (a technical proof is available upon request from the authors). However, if
two assumptions are violated, the K–S result might not remain valid. Extending the analysis to compare
the equilibrium results of Cournot competition with outcomes of two-stage game would be a useful future
study, if the demand function can be explicitly converted to inverse demand function.
F. Qin et al.
123
Next, we analyze how the change of nationalization degree affects passenger
demand, consumer surplus and producer surplus. All results are summarized in the
following propositions.
Proposition 3 An increase in the level of nationalization (1) increases the total
demand of local public transport in the equilibrium oQNE

or[ 0
 
; (2) increases
the ridership of rail transit under the equilibrium, but reduces the ridership for bus,
oQNEr

or[ 0 and oQNEb

or\0.
Proof See ‘‘Appendix 3’’.
The insights behind Proposition 3 are as follows: when the rail operator attaches
a high weight to consumer surplus, this welfare concern puts a downward pressure
on rail fare and an upward incentive on raising rail frequency. The combination of
lower fare and higher frequency makes rail transit services more attractive than
before. Thus, its ridership is boosted along with its strengthened market share.
However, only concerning its profit, the bus service becomes progressively less
attractive, although it also reduces its fares to compete against rail transit.
Proposition 4 Since travellers pay less in the move from a standard duopoly (SD)
to a mixed duopoly (MD), the consumer surplus necessarily rises alongside the
boost in total public transport demand. At the same time, there is a reduction in
producer surplus when we move away from a standard private duopoly (SD) to a
mixed duopoly (MD).
Proof See the ‘‘Appendix 4’’.
Whilst the effects of nationalization on consumer surplus and producer surplus
are straightforward now, we are not certain whether the increase in consumer
surplus can compensate for the loss of producer surplus as the rail transit operator
puts more weight on consumer surplus. Therefore, the impact of nationalization on
social welfare is still ambiguous. So we turn to a numerical study based primarily on
a mixed public transport market in a Chinese city.
2.5 An extension to a large-scale transit network
The above analytical modelling provides some useful and interesting insights into
the mixed oligopolistic competition. Nonetheless, the above analysis involves only
single-path model. In reality, most cities commonly characterized with a large-scale
transport network with multiple paths and OD pairs. Thus, it is meaningful to
explore the strategic interactions and market equilibrium in a complex transit
network of a city.
Considering an urban area, there already exists one public transport network
G = (N, A) where, N is set of transit stations (nodes) and A is the set of transit links
with the link a (a [ A). Within a W set of OD pair, bus and rail transit companies
operate parallel services between a particular OD pair, w (w [ W). The notation
used for this complex network is given as follows:
The welfare effects of nationalization in a mixed duopoly…
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Rw Set of transit routes r between OD pair w
va Total passenger flow on transit link a;
hrw Passenger flow on path r, r [ Rw;
Ma
i Probability of passengers on link a choosing public transport mode i;
fa
i Service frequency of public transport mode i on link a;
Pa
i The fare of public transport mode i on link a;
qw Passenger flow between OD pair w;
Dw
-1 Inverse demand function between OD pair w;
ccw
r Composite cost on route r between OD pair w;
OCa
i Operating cost of running transit services though link a for operator i;
With the above notion, the issue of interest is a mixed oligopolistic equilibrium
subject to a stochastic traffic assignment. The problem can be converted as bi-level
transit equilibrium model, which involve equilibrium at both lower (Stochastic User
Equilibrium, SUE) and upper levels (Nash Equilibrium in the mixed oligopolymarket).
2.5.1 The upper level—mixed oligopolistic equilibrium
MaxOFb ¼
X
w2W
X
a2A
PbavaM
b
a  OCba
 
ð22Þ
MaxOFr ¼
X
w2W
X
a2A
rðva=nÞ  PravaMra  OCra
  
ð23Þ
For each operator i, a level of frequency (fa
i ) and price charged (Pa
i ) are the only two
variables chosen by each firm subject to the resulting passenger flow being in a
stochastic user equilibrium (SUE). The link flow (va) can be determined by the
following lower problem.
2.5.2 The lower level—Stochastic user equilibrium
For a given fare and service frequency, passenger will set their transit routes with
the SUE manner. As proved by Lam and Zhou (1999), Lam et al. (2002), the SUE
assignment problem is equivalent to the following minimization problem:
Min
1
h
X
w2W
X
r2Rw
hrwðln hrw  1Þ  1h
X
w2W
qwðln qw  1Þ
þ
X
a2A
ccava 
X
w2W
Z qw
0
D1w ðyÞdy ð24Þ
Subject to
va ¼
P
w2W
P
r2Rw
sarhrw sar ¼ 1 if link a lies on path r; 0 otherwise ð25Þ
qw ¼
X
r2Rw
darhrw dwr ¼ 1 if path r connects ODpairw; 0 otherwise ð26Þ
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The presented bi-level transit network equilibrium problem follows similar
modeling principles so that the results do not qualitatively change with respect to
the sign-path analytical model presented in the previous section. Nevertheless, with
more paths, more links and more OD pairs, competition intensity increases, thus
eventually lower the benefits of having a public transport operator.
The bi-level network equilibrium model can be solved by a heuristic algorithm.
Since the problem becomes quite complex in a large-scale network, up to now we
cannot give an efficient algorithm to solve this bi-level network equilibrium model.
In the future, it is much imperative to develop efficient solution algorithms
applicable to general network. Moreover, due to the lack of data for a large-scale
transport network, the numerical evaluation of the proposed bi-level transit
equilibrium model for a real transportation network is also on open issue for the
future research.
3 Numerical case studies
To shed light on the impacts of partial nationalization on equilibrium outputs under
a mixed duopoly market, this section begins with introducing Bertrand pricing game
in Case 1, in which service frequency is less flexible in the short run. In Case 2,
adding frequency as another strategic device, we illustrate the long-run impact of
nationalization on Nash equilibrium solutions. To establish orders of magnitude for
key strategic variables and associated welfare elements, Suzhou traffic data are used
to gauge the results. Table 1 summarizes all traffic data and parameters used.
In the following numerical calculations, the traffic data and parameters, such as
average fares, general operating characteristics of public transport, and value of time
Table 1 Traffic data and parameters
Description Measurement Rail transit Bus
Average running speed (Vi) Km/hour 40 20
In-vehicle travelling time (Ti) Hour 0.225 0.45
Vehicle capacity (Kmi) Passenger/vehicle 960 102
Variable running costs (ci1) CNY/vehicle-km 22 8.9
Marginal passenger cost (cio) CNY/passenger 0.002 0.0015
Fare (Pi0) CNY 3 1.5
Frequency (fi) Vehicle/hour 12 8
Market share (Mi0) Percent (%) 84.46 % 15.54 %
Patronage of service i (Qi0) Passengers/hour 4223 777
Total public transport demand (Q

) Passengers/hour 5000
Value of time (q) CNY/hour 10.1
Scale parameter (h) 1
Weights of in-vehicle time (a1) 1
Weights of waiting time (a2) 2
Parameter in total transit demand (n) 0.2
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(VOT), were sourced from the Annual Report of Suzhou Urban Transportation
(2008). Furthermore, concerning operating costs of bus, the information stems from
Suzhou Bus Group Annual Report (2008). This report illustrates the variable
operating costs of running an extra bus kilometre are 8.9 CNY and the marginal cost
per passenger journey 0.0015 CNY. In terms of rail transit, the figures of variable
operating costs (22 CNY per kilometre and 0.002 CNY per passenger) are estimated
by referring to the accounting report of Suzhou Metro Company. Hong and Zuo
(2006) estimated the sensitivity of transit passengers to changes of traveling costs in
several Chinese cities. The results indicate that for a 1 % reduction in traveling
costs, there is a 0.1–0.4 % increase in public transport patronage. In order to make
the following cases more illustrative, operational features of bus and rail transit,
such as their average running speed, vehicle capacity, are also listed in Table 1.
Setting the current situation as a reference case, we can compare how fares,
frequencies, market shares, social welfare and its constituent parts change with the
degree of nationalization. With 5000 commuters per morning peak hour, the rail
transit line catches a significantly larger market share (84.46 %) than the bus
(15.54 %).
3.1 Case one: the effect of nationalization (r) on equilibra in the short run
In the short run, public transport operators cannot afford more frequent services due
to the additional cost of increasing their fleet. Thus, both operators compete purely
on price, assuming service frequencies are exogenously given. In Case one, to assess
the impact of the level of nationalization (r) on equilibrium configurations, the
analysis begins with the move from standard private duopoly (SD, r = 0) to a
mixed duopoly (MD, r[ 0) case. As mentioned earlier, the parameter—r, is
Table 2 Effect of nationalization (r) on equilibrium solutions in the short run
r = 0 r = 0.2 r = 0.4 r = 0.6 r = 0.8 r = 1
Bus fare (Pb) 1.219 1.17 1.124 1.081 1.046 1.021
Rail transit fare (Pr) 2.643 2.326 1.945 1.463 0.828 0.002
Market share of bus (Mb) 21.98 % 17.73 % 13.36 % 9.04 % 5.17 % 2.39 %
Market share of rail transit (Mr) 78.02 % 82.27 % 86.64 % 90.96 % 94.83 % 97.61 %
Total public transport demand (Q*) 5458 5754 6145 6701 7546 8850
Passenger demand of bus (Qb) 1200 1020 821 606 390 211
Passenger demand of rail transit (Qr) 4258 4734 5324 6095 7156 8639
Producer surplus (PS) 10053 9499 8573 6869 3623 -2477
D Profit of bus (pb) 1184 875 605 338 91 -101
D Profit of rail transit (pr) 8869 8624 7968 6531 3532 -2376
Consumer surplus (CS) 27,289 28,768 30,726 33,505 37,732 44,250
Social welfare (SW) 37,742 38,267 39,299 40,374 41,355 41,773
PS is the producer surplus, which is the sum of bus’s profit (pb) and rail’s profit (pr)
SW is the social welfare, which is the sum of producer surplus (PS) and consumer surplus (CS)
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continuous. But for the sake of exposition, in Tables 2 and 3, we only list numerical
equilibrium solutions with r varying in steps of 0.2.
The first two rows of Table 2 show that, as expected, the equilibrium prices of
bus and rail transit decrease when rail operator places more weight on consumer
surplus. Thus, for different values of r, the pair of equilibrium fares are highest in
standard private duopoly with 1.219 CNY for bus and 2.643 CNY for rail transit,
and lowest in the mixed duopoly situation (r = 1) with only 1.021 CNY for bus and
0.002 CNY for rail transit. Moreover, the synchronous decrease in bus and rail
transit fares indicates the prices are strategic complements, which means the prices
set by bus company decrease in response to the price reduction of Rail Company.
Although both equilibrium fares move in the same direction (downward), the rate of
decrease of rail transit fare is much greater. When the nationalization degree
exceeds 0.8, rail transit has a competitive advantage over bus in terms of its
relatively low fare.
From Fig. 1a, it can be observed that the total demand of local public transport
(Q*) and rail transit (Qr) increase gradually with the increase in r. On the contrary,
since rail transit attracts increasing numbers of travellers from buses due to its
relatively low generalized cost, the market share of the bus quickly shrinks from
21.98 to 2.39 %. The logic behind the result can be explained as follows. The
overall impact of nationalization on patronage is the combination of two effects: the
first is increasing total demand for public transport, and the second is the shifting of
market share between modes. Regarding rail transit, the more weight the rail transit
firm places on consumer surplus, the greater the aggregate demand and rail
operator’s market share will be. Conversely, since the decreasing market share
dominates the increase of total public transport demand, the equilibrium patronage
of bus falls with the increasing degree of nationalization. Consequently, a further
decrease in both firms’ prices triggered by nationalization boosts the total public
Table 3 Effect of nationalization (r) on equilibrium solutions in the long run
r = 0 r = 0.1 r = 0.3 r = 0.5 r = 0.7 r = 0.9
Bus fare (Pb) 1.253 1.221 1.158 1.097 1.038 0.889
Rail transit fare (Pr) 2.498 2.373 2.091 1.742 1.279 0.611
Bus frequency (fb) 13.62 13.02 11.58 9.61 6.35 3.53
Rail transit frequency (fr) 14.96 15.39 16.33 17.46 18.9 19.43
Market share of bus (Mb) 25.13 % 22.50 % 16.93 % 10.94 % 4.37 % 0.75 %
Market share of rail transit (Mr) 74.87 % 77.50 % 83.07 % 89.06 % 95.63 % 99.25 %
Total public transport demand (Q*) 5857 5987 6395 6709 7320 8327
Passenger demand of bus (Qb) 1472 1347 1066 734 320 62
Passenger demand of rail transit (Qr) 4385 4640 5229 5875 7000 8265
Producer surplus (PS) 8735 8553 7993 6976 5022 965
D Profit of bus (pb) 753 600 306 35 -176 -227
D Profit of rail transit (pr) 7982 7953 7687 6941 5198 1192
Consumer surplus (CS) 29,287 29,933 31,472 33,542 36,599 41,637
Social welfare (SW) 38,022 38,489 39,465 40,518 4162 42602
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transport demand. In such a case, the rail transit significantly erodes the market
share of bus and the bus operator gradually loses its competitive advantage.
As illustrated in Fig. 1b, although the ridership of rail transit rises, the sharp
reduction in fares cause the rail transit operator’s profits to rapidly tail off. Due to
the rail transit operator’s relatively high operating cost, the low fare revenue cannot
cover its variable operating costs when the degree of nationalization exceeds 0.9.
When r reaches 1, it would be difficult for rail transit operator to remain profitable,
the rail transit operator would require subsidies from local government. On the
contrary, although the combined effect of fare reduction and shrinking ridership
results in a considerable decrease in the profits of the bus, the relatively lower
operating cost makes the bus operator profitable when the value of r does not
exceed 0.9. In the extreme case of the rail transit operator fully considering
consumer surplus (r = 1), the bus operator cannot break even. As the profit is
squeezed, the bus operator might drop out of business.
In the mixed duopoly, lower equilibrium prices and higher total transit demand
have positive impacts on consumer surplus, implying consumer surplus rises by a
considerable amount. Although the producer surplus falls with the increase in the
degree of nationalization, these losses are relatively small compared with the gain in
consumer surplus. Consequently, total social welfare increases slightly, this
demonstrates the desirability of nationalizing rail transit operators.
The numerical results are consistent with the analytical results obtained in
previous section and can be summarized in Remark 1:
Remark 1 An increase in the level of nationalization causes equilibrium prices to
fall for both bus and rail transit. Moreover, there is a rise in social welfare when we
move away from a standard private duopoly (SD) to a mixed duopoly (MD).
The above remark states that, in the process of nationalization, as the rail transit
operator puts more weights on consumer surplus relative to its profit, the price
Fig. 1 The impacts of partial nationalization on equlibria in short run. a The effect of r on passenger
demand, b the effect of r on operator’s profits
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competition in the mixed duopoly market become fiercer. Since travellers pay less
in the move from a standard duopoly (SD) to a mixed duopoly (MD), consumer
surplus, thereby boosting total public transport demand. Also, since the increase in
consumer surplus can compensate for the loss of producer surplus, partial
nationalization is socially preferable in terms of welfare improvement.
3.2 The effect of nationalization (r) on equilibria in the long run
In the long run, since the operator has the ability to adjust its fleet size to match
fierce market competitions, service frequency might be another strategic device. In
this numerical case, we turn to Nash price–frequency competition and attempt to
demonstrate how the operators respond to the progress of nationalization. The
numerical equilibrium solutions for this Nash non-cooperative game are summa-
rized in Table 3.
As Table 3 shows, the motive of increasing consumer surplus induces the rail
transit operator to increase its frequencies and reduce fares. Since prices are strategic
complements in this price-frequency game, the gradually decreasing rail transit fares
provides an incentive to bus operator to defend its market share by responding with a
fare reduction.On the contrary, in this casewith endogenous frequency, it emerges that
service frequencies are strategic substitutes. Thus, responding to the increase in rail
transit frequency, the bus operator is forced to reduce its service frequency to prevent
further deterioration of profitability (see Fig. 2a).
In comparison to Case 1, the most likely effect of adding service frequency as
another strategic variable is that total public transport ridership has been greatly
boosted, because the lower composite costs resulting from additional competitions
over frequency increase the attractiveness of public transport. Similarly, when rail
operator attaches a high weight to consumer surplus and a correspondingly low
Fig. 2 The impacts of partial nationalization on equlibria in long run. a The effect of r on service, b the
effect of r on consumer surplus and welfare
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weight on profit, its market share will be strengthened. On the other hand,
conventional bus services become progressively worse off since its service levels
are not as attractive as before. The ridership of buses diminishes fast. Then, in the
case of full nationalization, a corner solution can be obtained in which the rail
operator satisfies all demand. As far as operators’ profits are concerned, both
operators experience financial losses in the process of nationalization. Once the
value of r exceeds 0.5, the bus loses the commercial feasibility of operating services
due to the negative profits. However, the welfare comparisons show that the
increase in consumer surplus offsets the losses in operators’ profits, which supports
the desirability of a mixed oligopoly (see Fig. 2b).
The main finding of Case 2 is summarized in Remark 2.
Remark 2 In Nash non-cooperative game, with the motive of increasing consumer
surplus (1) the rail transit operator intends to reduce fare and increases its service
frequency. The bus operator strategically chooses to reduce both fare and frequency
(2) the increase in consumer surplus offsets the losses in producer surplus, leading to
the increase of social welfare.
The studies of mixed duopoly in industrial organization suggests that without
other regulations, nationalization will heighten social welfare if there are relatively
few private firms in the market and will degrade social welfare if there are relatively
many private firms, assuming Cournot quantity-setting competition with an inelastic
and linear demand function (Anderson et al. 1997; De Fraja and Delbono 1990).
From the above numerical case studies, it can be concluded that full nationalization
yields the highest level of social welfare in the public transport market. Thus, the
numerical cases provide support for previous findings on Nash non-cooperative
game in the context of an elastic and non-linear demand function.
The above numerical results rely heavily on specific dataset from Suzhou city.
Hence, the generality of results is restricted to some extent. To determine whether
the results are universal of specific, we carry out the following sensitivity analysis.
3.3 Sensitivity analysis
The numerical results of equilibrium configurations are dependent on a variety of
system parameters. Among these parameters, the characteristics of transport demand
and supply especially differ from one city to another. To this end, we focus on two
parameters, namely, the users’ cost perception (the demand parameter, n) and the
producers’ operating cost (operating cost coefficients of rail cr1), which are important
variations among cities. In what follows, we investigate the sensitivity of equilibria, in
particular, the operators’ fares and frequencies under changes in these two parameters.
3.3.1 Sensitivity analysis with respect to users’ cost perception (n)
Characterizing with different income level and different information technology,
passengers in different cities may have different perceptions on travel cost
variations. For example, when passengers in one city can achieve greater or more
accurate travel information, they will have higher value of n. To investigate the
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likely response of equilibrium prices and frequencies to the change of demand
parameter (n), the value of n varies from 0.1 to 0.5 with steps of 0.1. In Fig. 3, we
display the variations in the equilibrium fare and frequency under changes of
demand parameter (n).
Regarding the sensitivity of equilibrium results to parameter n, the following can
be observed from Fig. 3. First, when residents of one city may have a higher
accuracy in perceiving the travel costs (a higher value of n), the equilibrium fares
for both bus and rail transit go down. Furthermore, the fare difference between bus
and rail transit becomes smaller with the increase of value n, suggesting intense
price competition. Second, when the travelers have higher cost sensitivities—n, the
rail transit operator intends to provide more frequent services; the bus operator’s
operating behaviors in respond to changes of n becomes complicated. Finally,
making travelling demand more cost sensitive does not affect the qualitative results
obtained in Remark 1 and Remark 2.
Fig. 3 Sensitivity of equilibrium fares and frequencies w.r.p to changes in n. a The rail transit fare
change w.r.p n, b the bus fare change w.r.p n, c the rail transit frequency change w.r.p n, d the bus
frequency change w.r.p n
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3.3.2 Sensitivity analysis with respect to suppliers’ operating cost (ci1)
In terms of operating costs, we observe that the cost efficiency of one transit
operator has been affected by many factors, such as operational scales, organization
structure, potential demand rate, regulatory regime and so on. Thus, the various
operating environments in different cities do have great impacts on the operating
efficiencies of operators. Since the slopes of frequency reaction functions are
directly affected by the variable operating cost, they are likely to be important in
determining the equilibrium results. To show how the operating cost difference
affect the Nash equilibrium frequencies and prices, we keep the operating cost of
bus fixed but the costs of operating rail transit services are changed for this 9 km
transport link. With the increase of rail transit operating costs (from 40 CNY to 198
CNY), the cost advantage of bus becomes strong (Fig. 4).
The main insight from this exercise is that: an increase in the operating cost of
rail transit reduces the Nash equilibrium fare and service frequency for rail transit
services. However, since the cost difference between bus and rail transit becomes
Fig. 4 Sensitivity of equilibrium fare and frequency with respect to changes in (cr1). a The rail transit
fare change w.r.p cr1, b the bus fare change w.r.p cr1, c the rail transit frequency change w.r.p cr1, d the
bus frequency change w.r.p cr1
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larger, the bus operator has a stronger cost advantage over rail transit. Thus, the bus
operator can afford to run more frequent services and charge higher fare than before.
Not surprisingly, we found that the magnitudes of equilibrium outcomes are
somewhat sensitive to the demand parameter and operating cost coefficient.
However, the qualitative conclusions about the effect of nationalization degree on
equilibrium results in Remark 1 and Remark 2 are found to be unaffected.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, the duopolistic interactions between one public rail transit operator
and one private bus operator are presented as a Nash non-cooperative game. To
investigate the effects of nationalization on equilibrium fares, service frequencies
and associated welfare elements, two numerical cases based on Suzhou traffic data
are analyzed and the main insights are presented as follows. Firstly, given the less
flexible service frequency in the short run, the presence of one publicly-owned rail
transit operator is a useful measure for approaching social optima. The more weight
the rail operator attached to consumer surplus, the lower the equilibrium fare,
leading to higher consumer surplus and social welfare. Secondly, in Nash non-
cooperative game with price and frequency competition, prices are a strategic
complement. Due to this, when the rail operator reduces (or increases) its fare level,
it forces the bus operator to do the same. Meanwhile, a marginal frequency increase
(decrease) in rail transit service causes bus operator to decrease (increase) its
frequency, indicating service frequencies are strategic substitutes. Finally, if no
additional regulations are implemented, nationalizing one rail transit company is
socially desirable both in Bertrand pricing game in the short-run and in Nash non-
cooperative game in the long-run. This result is in line with the previous studies’
results on mixed oligopolies. That is, when the number of private companies is
relatively small, privatizing one public firm degrades social welfare.
The analysis performed in the paper captures the present status of urban public
transport market in many Chinese cities where newly introduced state-owned rail
transit services compete with extant private bus companies. Although the above
model is simply based on a duopolistic setup, the results have generated many
managerial implications for the transport authority, public and private transit
operators. Regarding the transport authority, it can use the nationalization as a mean
to regulate the competitive urban transport market. Moreover, in both short and long
term, the authority should carefully consider the amount of emphasis a public rail
operator should place on consumer surplus compared to its own profit. The Suzhou
case indicates that too much weight on consumer surplus may cause the private bus
operator to reduce its service frequencies and consequently lose incentive to remain
the market. On the other hand, too little emphasis on consumer surplus leads to
higher fares, though it may yield higher frequent bus services. Thus a proper policy
may be to find a happy compromise which will not only encourage private bus
firms, render public rail self-supporting, but also yield adequate consumer surplus in
the total social welfare. This paper has raised these important issues to understand
such a compromise decision. As far as Chinese urban transport policy is concerned,
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none of these issues has been seriously considered in the context of the
privatization/nationalization debate so far.
In future research, two avenues for extension could be considered. One is to
extend the analytical model to include multiple private bus firms and determine
whether the conclusions drawn from this paper remain valid. This extension requires
finding the Nash equilibrium for a mathematically more complex traffic network
model, perhaps utilizing a stochastic network. Another useful extension would be to
examine the cooperative possibility between bus transit and rail transit.
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Appendix 1: Equilibrium price in the short run
Taking the partial derivatives of Eq. (15) with respect to fares yields:
oOFi
oPi
¼ r
n
oQ
oPi
dþ Qi þ ðPi  ci0Þ oQioPi ð27Þ
where d is an indicator variable, which takes on the value of 1 for rail transit and 0
for bus.
Then, plugging Eqs. (6) and (7) into (27), we can obtain the equilibrium fares by
setting the corresponding results equal to zero:
oOFi
oPi
¼ Qi 1 rð Þd Pi  ci0ð Þ nMi þ hMj
   ¼ 0 ð28Þ
After some manipulation, the above expression reduces to
PNEi ¼
ð1 rÞd
hMj þ nMi þ ci0 ð29Þ
Next, we examine the effect of nationalization degree (r) on equilibrium fares.
Partially differentiating the first order condition in Eq. (27) for rail transit with
respect to its price yields:
oOFr
oPr
¼ oQr
oPr
1 rð Þ  Pr  crð Þ h ðh nÞMr½ f g
þ Qr ðh nÞMr  h½  þ Pr  cr0ð Þðh nÞ oMroPr
 	
ð30Þ
Substituting (7) and oMr=oPr ¼ hMr Mr  1ð Þ into (24), we can rewrite (30) as:
o2OFr
oP2r
¼ Qr 2 rð Þ h nð ÞMr  h½   Pr  crð Þ h ðh nÞMr½ 2
n
þ Pr  cr0ð Þðh2  hnÞMr Mr  1ð Þ

 ð31Þ
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Because the sign of h nð ÞMr  h½  and Mr  1ð Þ is negative, and other items in
(31) are positive, it is easy to prove o2OFr=oP2i\0.
Taking the first derivative of (27) with respect to nationalization degree, we
obtain o2OFr

oPror ¼ rQr\0, and then we get:
dPNEr ðrÞ
dr
¼  o
2OFr

oPror
o2OFr

oP2r
\0 ð32Þ
Appendix 2: Equilibrium price and frequency in the long run
Partially differentiating the payoff function of operator i with respect to frequency
leads to:
oOFi
oft
¼ r
n
oQ
ofi
dþ Pi  ci0ð Þ oQiofi  ci1 ð33Þ
Substituting Eqs. (7) and (29) into (33) yields the equilibrium frequency for
public transport service i:
f 2i ¼ Q
X
i
expðh CiÞ
" #nha2q
2ci1
expðhCiÞ
X
i
expðhCiÞ
" #n
h1
ð34Þ
Recalling the demand function for public transport service i in Eq. (6), we
replace Q
P
i expðh CiÞ
 ðn=hÞ
expðhCiÞ
P
i¼b;r expðhCiÞ
h iðn=hÞ1
with Qi and
select the positive root:
f NEi ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
a2q
2ci1
Qi
r
ð35Þ
Appendix 3: The effect of nationalization degree on equilibrium demand
and welfare
Analogous to the above propositions, we can analytically explore the effects of
nationalization degree on equilibrium demand for bus and rail transit:
oQNEr
or
¼ oQ
NE
r
of NEr
of NEr
r
ð36Þ
oQNEb
or
¼ oQ
NE
b
of NEr
of NEr
r
ð37Þ
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Recalling Eqs. (7), (8) and (21), we have oQNEr

or[ 0 and oQNEb

or\0. In
terms of total demand for whole public transport, we take the first derivative of Q*
with respect to nationalization degree (r), which yields:
oQNE

or
¼ o Q
NE
r þ QNEb
 
or
¼ oP
NE
r
or
oQNEr
oPNEr
þ oQ
NE
b
oPNEr
 
ð38Þ
Substituting Eqs. (7), (8) and (18) into (38) and rearranging items provides the
following:
oQNE

or
¼ n oP
NE
r
or
QNEr [ 0 ð39Þ
Appendix 4: The effect of nationalization degree on consumer surplus
and producer surplus
Recalling the expression of consumer surplus in (13), since oQNE

or[ 0, we have
oCSNE=or[ 0.
The producer surplus can be decomposed into two parts: the part associated with
patronage and the part related to frequency:
PS ¼
X
i¼b;r
pi ¼
X
i¼b;r
ðPi  c0iÞQi 
X
i¼b;r
ðc1iÞfi ð40Þ
Differentiating
P
i¼b;r ðPi  c0iÞQi with respect to r and rearranging the terms
gives:
o
P
i¼b;r P
NE
i  ci0
 
QNEi
or
¼ oP
NE
r
or
QNEr þ
oQNEr
oPNEr
oPNEr
or
PNEr  cr0
 þ oP
NE
b
or
QNEb
þ oQ
NE
b
or
PNEb  cb0
  ð41Þ
Substituting (7) for oQNEr

oPNEr and Eq. (18) for P
NE
r  cr0
 
into (41) yields:
o
P
i¼b;r ðPNEr  cr0ÞQNEr
or
¼ oP
NE
r
or
QNEr rþ
oPNEb
or
QNEb þ
oQNEb
or
ðPNEb  cb0Þ\0 ð42Þ
Given oPNEr

or\0, oPNEb

or\0 and oQNEb

or\0, it can be easily shown that
o
P
i¼b;r ðPNEr  cr0ÞQNEr =or\0.
Given the straightforward relationship MNEr þMNEb ¼ 1 and recalling the
expressions for equilibrium frequencies in Eq. (20) yields:
X
i¼b;r
ðc1iÞfi ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
a2qcr1
2
QNE

MNEr
r
þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
a2qcb1
2
QNE
 ð1MNEr Þ
r
ð43Þ
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Differentiating Eq. (43) with respect to r and rearranging the terms yields:
o
P
i¼b:r ci1f
NE
i
or
¼ oQ
NE
or
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
a2q
8QNE

r ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
cr1MNEr
q
þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
cb1ð1MNEr Þ
q 
þ oM
NE
r
or
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
a2q
2QNE

r ffiffiffiffiffiffi
cr1
p
2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
MNEr
p 
ffiffiffiffiffiffi
cb1
p
2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffið1MNEr Þ
p
 !
ð44Þ
After observing oQNE

or[ 0 and oMNEr

or[ 0, if the gap in operating costs
between rail transit and bus is large enough ð
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
cr1

MNEr
q

ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
cb1

MNEb
q
[ 0Þ, then
the sign of (44) is positive.
When the difference in production cost between rail transit and bus is large
enough, it is certain that producer surplus decreases with an increase in the degree of
nationalization o
P
pi=or\0ð Þ.
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